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A characterization of a general update rule for convex capacities, the G-updating rule,
is investigated. We introduce a consistency property which bridges between unconditional
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axiomatic basis for the G-updating rule is established through consistent counterfactual
acts, which take the form of trinary acts expressed in terms of G, an ordered tripartition
of global states.
JEL Classi￿cation: D81
Keywords: ambiguous belief, Bayes￿ rule, update rule, convex capacity, Choquet ex-
pected utility, conditional preference
1. INTRODUCTION
A decision maker￿ s subjectively uncertain situations are formally described in
non-additive probabilities or multiple priors, for which update rules are also ex-
tensively investigated in the economic literature on the subject. Among them, the
Dempster-Shafer rule(Shafer(1976)) (the DS rule) is one of the most momentous
update rules for non-additive probabilities. This rule for convex capacities is ex-
amined in Gilboa and Schmeidler(1993) by way of an elegant, systematic method,
the f-Bayesian update rule. They also showed that the DS rule is equivalent to the
maximum likelihood estimation.
Fagin and Halpern(1991) presented an update rule (the DFH rule) for in-
ner/outer measures or belief/plausibility functions, which was originally suggested
by Dempster(1967). Tapking(2004) deals with a collection of updated preference
relations de￿ned on conditional acts and proposes axioms for the DFH rule. The
essence of the axiomatization is the Choquet expected utility (CEU) representation
and the fact that a convex capacity updated by the DFH rule conforms to the lower
probabilities of the posterior set updated by the full Bayesian update rule (the FB
rule) in Ja⁄ray(1992).
Pires (2002) reviews the FB rule or what is called the belief-by-belief updating
rule, which is an update rule for a set of priors. The central axiom characterizing
the FB rule is Axiom 9, which is called conditional certainty equivalent consistency
in Eichberger et al. (2007). The FB rule and the DFH rule generates the common
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1lower envelope of the updated belief set when the same prior set is given. However,
the posterior set updated by the FB rule may be strictly included in the core of
the updated capacity through the DFH rule as shown in Ja⁄ray(1992). Therefore,
the FB rule and the DFH rule should be seen as di⁄erent rules as pointed out by
Horie(2007), which shows that the conditional certainty equivalent consistency for
binary gambles is the central property to characterize the DFH rule.
The primary objective of this paper is to characterize a general update rule,
called the G-updating rule (Horie(2006)). The G-updating rule enables us to deal
with apparently di⁄erent conditioning rules as a single rule with each di⁄erent pa-
rameter G, which takes the form of an ordered tripartition of the global states. To
achieve characterization, we introduce a consistency property which bridge between
unconditional and conditional preferences, and deduce an update rule for uncondi-
tional capacities. The primitives of our decision model are an unconditional and
conditional preference relations on the set of Savage acts.
In the conventional Bayesian approach, the conditional preferences are never
a⁄ected by what have not been observed, i.e. any counterfactual event. In the
context of the subjective expected utility theory, it is implied by the independency
in the sure-thing principle of Savage(1972).
However, under a subjectively ambiguous situation, information in the coun-
terfactual event might a⁄ect the formation of posteriors as a result of a decision
maker￿ s subjective reasoning to try to reduce ambiguity. In our framework, this
is formally embodied in counterfactual acts, which are assumed on the unrealized
events, counterfactual events.
The axiomatic basis for update rules is established through a set of consistent
counterfactual acts. This formula is a natural extension of the f-Bayesian update
rule, where an act "f" is assumed to be a unique consistent counterfactual act. In
case of the G-updating rule, the f-Bayesian update is extended in two directions.
(i)Although in the f-Bayesian update rule a consistent counterfactual act has to
be unique and common among all acts, consistent counterfactual acts in the G-
updating rule are allowed to depend on the conditional certainty equivalence of any
(binary) act. Therefore, the set of consistent counterfactual acts is not assumed
to be singleton. (ii)The consistency are imposed only on the set of binary acts,
not all acts. The reason is that, the G-updating rule evaluates the observed event
quite di⁄erently dependent upon which subevent is taken into account. Relaxing
the requirement for all acts into binary acts enables us to conform coherently to
such inconstancy.
The main result of this paper formally characterizes the G-updating rule through
a property that assures the existence of a consistent counterfactual act for binary
acts, which formalizes unconditional preferences in terms of the unconditional pref-
erences. The set of consistent counterfactual acts may be chosen from the set of
all acts according to the magnitude of its conditional certainty equivalence of any
binary acts. As a consequence, it is proved that trinary acts which yields the best,
worst, and the conditional certainty equivalence outcomes are the representatives
of the set of consistent counterfactual acts.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section provides the basic de-
￿nitions and introduces the G-updating rule. Section 3 begins with illustrating
the main axiom and proves the existence of G that characterizing the conditional
preferences. The uniqueness of such a G is investigated in the later subsection.
22. A GENERAL UPDATE RULE
2.1. Basic Set Up
Let ￿ be a ￿nite set of states with j￿j = n and ￿ = 2￿. We call a non-empty set
in ￿ an event. Let X ￿ R be a set of consequences, or outcomes which is assumed
to be X = [x;x] with x < x. A function f : ￿ ! X is called an act. Denote the
set of all acts by F. For the sake of simplicity, an element x in X also indicates a
constant act which assigns x for all ! 2 ￿. fEg denotes the act which yields f (!)
if ! 2 E and g (!) if ! 2 Ec.
A ￿nite set function ￿ : ￿ ! [0;1] is called a capacity on ￿ if it satis￿es (i)
￿(?) = 0 and ￿(￿) = 1, and (ii) for every A and B in ￿ with A ￿ B, we have
￿(A) 5 ￿(B). A capacity ￿ is said to be convex if for every A and B in ￿,
￿(A [ B)+￿(A \ B) = ￿(A)+￿(B). Given an event E, a conditional or updated
capacity ￿E is a capacity on E, i.e. for all A in ￿ with A \ E = E, ￿E (A) = 1.
Note that for any event E in ￿, ￿E has domain ￿. When E = ￿, ￿￿ is interpreted
as the unconditional capacity and we simply write it ￿. Let
R
f d￿ denote the
Choquet integral (expected value) of f with respect to ￿.
Let ￿ be a set of all binary relations on F. We are concerned with preference
relations on F before and after an event E is realized. Given an event E in ￿, a
preference relation %E in ￿ is called a conditional preference relation contingent on
E. As usual, ￿E and ￿E refer to asymmetric and symmetric parts of %E respec-
tively. When E = ￿, %￿ is interpreted as the unconditional preference relation and
we simply express it as %. Throughout this paper, we focus on preference relations
that satisfy the following representation (Schmeidler (1989) and Gilboa(1987)):
(CEU) There exist a continuous, non-constant utility function u : X ! R unique
up to positive linear transformations and a convex capacity ￿E such that for
all f, g in F
f %E g ()
Z
u ￿ f d￿E =
Z
u ￿ g d￿E.
Let ￿CE be the set of binary relations satisfy CEU. A conditional preference
relation %E 2 ￿CE is called represented by (u;￿E), that is, %E is represented by a
Choquet expected utility with respected to u and ￿E. By u￿ s non-constancy of u,
it is assumed that for all E 2 ￿, x ￿E x. Since u is unique up to positive linear
transformations, we normalize u so that u(x) = 0 and u(x) = 1.
2.2. The G-Updating Rule
A general update rule, called the G-updating rule, is de￿ned as follows (Horie(2006)).
Suppose the set of states ￿ is partitioned into three disjoint sets Gi, i = 1;2;3,
where some Gi is possibly empty. Denote an ordered triplet of Gi, i = 1;2;3 by
G = hG1;G2;G3i and let G consist of all such ordered triplets of ￿. Given a G 2 G
and an event E 2 ￿, de￿ne T
G;E
i ￿ Ec \ Gi, i = 1;2;3. Although every T
G;E
i
depends on G and E, we denote it by Ti, i = 1;2;3 instead of T
G;E
i for brevity￿ s
sake when the reference is clear.
Given a G 2 G and an event E 2 ￿, we de￿ne the G-updating rule for a capacity
3￿ given E through, for every A 2 ￿
￿G
E (A) =
￿((A \ E) [ T2) ￿ ￿(T2)
[￿((A \ E) [ T2) ￿ ￿(T2)] + [￿(E [ T2 [ T3) ￿ ￿((A \ E) [ T2 [ T3)]
.
(1)
If ￿(E) > 0, then ￿G
E is well-de￿ned.
The G-updating rule has some interesting properties. The ￿rst is that, it in-
cludes the NB rule, the DS rule, and the DFH rule as special cases. If G =






for every A 2 ￿.
When G = h?;G2;?i, (1) is reduced to the Dempster-Shafer rule (DS rule):
￿DS
E (A) =
￿((A \ E) [ Ec) ￿ ￿(Ec)
1 ￿ ￿(Ec)
for every A 2 ￿.
Note that the f-Bayesian update rule includes the NB rule and the DS rule as
special cases. Finally, the updated capacity ￿DFH





￿(A \ E) + 1 ￿ ￿((A \ E) [ Ec)
for every A 2 ￿.
The most important property is that the G-updating rule preserves convexity.
It is veri￿ed by the fact that the G-updating constitutes a 3-step conditioning where
one of three rules above, the NB rule, the DS rule and the DFH rule is applied in
each step as follows. In the ￿rst step, T1 out of Ec is revised by the NB rule, in
the second step T2 is revised by the DS rule, and in the ￿nal step T3 is revised
by the DFH rule. Notice that interchanging step 1 with step 2 generates the same
updated capacity (1) since the NB rule and the DS rule are both commutative as
in Gilboa and Schmeidler(1993).
3. CHARACTERIZATION OF G-UPDATING RULE
3.1. Axiom
Given an act f 2 F, let R(f) ￿ Xn be the range of f. De￿ne the set of k-
dimensional (or, k-outcome) acts by Fk = ff 2 F j dimR(f) 5 kg. We especially
call F1 the set of constant acts, which stands for X. When k = n, Fk is equal to
the set of all acts F. Since dimR(f) 5 n for all f 2 F, it is e⁄ective to set k 5 n.
An act in F2 is called a binary act. Any binary act f 2 F2 is expressed by
some A 2 ￿, f (A), and f (￿nA) to be f (A)A f (￿nA). We can in turn construct
an arbitrary binary act f 2 F2 from some b, w 2 X, b = w and A 2 ￿ denoted by
bAw, which is called a binary act on A.
Similarly, the set of trinary acts is written as F3. It will be useful to introduce
particular trinary acts f 2 F3, whose range R(f) contains the best and the worst
outcomes, x and x. Formally, for every x 2 X de￿ne
A(x) =
￿
f 2 F3 jf (!) 2 fx;x;xg for all ! 2 ￿
￿
,
4and let A =
S
x2X A(x). Recall that the aforementioned G 2 G is an ordered
tripartition of ￿, and so an act in A is also expressed in terms of G. De￿ne ￿ :
X ￿G ! F by ￿(x;G) ￿ xG1xG2x. Note that ￿ is onto. That is, when x = x or x,
￿(x;G) = ￿(x;G0) can occur for G 6= G0, still every act in A is uniquely identi￿ed
by x and G. Although there are many overlaps in G, A(x) =
S
G2G f￿(x;G)g.
To characterize the G-updating rule, we are ready to introduce a consistency
property de￿ned as follows.
Definition 1. Given an unconditional preferences % in ￿ and an event E in ￿,
a conditional preference %E in ￿ has a conditional certainty-equivalently consistent
counterfactual act for binary acts (CCBA) if for every x in X there exists an act a
in F
x ￿E f , xEa ￿ fEa for all f 2 F2.
It will be useful to de￿ne the set of CCBAs in the following way: Given % 2 ￿,
E 2 ￿, and %E 2 ￿, de￿ne  
2





a 2 F jx ￿E f , xEa ￿ fEa for all f 2 F2￿
. (2)
%E has a CCBA if and only if  
2
E (x;%E;%) 6= ? for every x 2 X.
Although a conditional certainty-equivalently consistent counterfactual act for
k-dimensional acts are also de￿ned as  
k
E (￿ ;%E;%), there is a real signi￿cance in
 
2
E (￿ ;%E;%) and  
n
E (￿ ;%E;%).
In the Bayesian approach, the conditional preferences focus only on the realized
event and are never a⁄ected by the unrealized events. Formally, in terms of uncon-
ditional and conditional preferences, the Bayesian update rule is expressed as: for
all f, g, h 2 F, g %E h , gEf % hEf. Based on our formulation above, %E 2 ￿
is such that  
n
E(x;%E;%) = F for all x 2 X.
Given that % 2 ￿CE, the f-Bayesian update rule is de￿ned through a unique
conditional consistent counterfactual act f 2 F satisfying that for all g, h 2 F,
g %E h , gEf % hEf, which is equivalent to f 2  
n
E(x;%E;%) for all x 2 X.
Gilboa and Schmeidler(1993) prove that f = xSx for some S 2 ￿.
3.2. Main Results
3.2.1. Existence of G
The main result of this paper is the following theorem that characterizes the
G-updating rule:
Theorem 1. Suppose that the unconditional preference relation % in ￿CE is
represented by (u;￿). Given an event E in ￿ with jEj = 2 and ￿(E) > 0, the
following statements are equivalent:
(i) A conditional preference relation contingent on E, %E in ￿CE has a CCBA.





: for any f
and g in F
f %E g ()
Z
u ￿ f d￿G
E =
Z
u ￿ g d￿G
E,
where ￿G
E is de￿ned as in (1).
5Proof. Suppose that % 2 ￿CE represented by (u;￿) and event E 2 ￿ with
jEj = 2 and ￿(E) > 0 are given.
(i))(ii) This part will be proven through the following three lemmas. It is
assumed that a conditional preference relation %E 2 ￿CE has a CCBA. Given %E
2 ￿CE and an S ￿ E, let xS satisfy xS ￿E xSx.
Lemma 1. Suppose that %E 2 ￿CE is has a CCBA and for some S $ E, xS is
in (x;x). Then, there exists a G 2 G such that ￿(x;G) 2  
2
E (x;%E;%) for every
x 2 X.
Proof. Given an act a 2 F, de￿ne P (a) ￿
￿
! 2 ￿ j a(!) > xS￿
and P (a) ￿ ￿





P (a) [ P (a)
￿￿
by P (a) which is
an element of G. Note that a(!) = xS for every ! 2 P (a) [ P (a). Let T1 =
P (a) \ Ec, T2 = P (a) \ Ec, and T3 = Ecn(T1 [ T2).
Let jEcj = M > 0. An act a 2 F has at most M di⁄erent outcomes on Ec. Let










! 2 T2 and a
￿
!l+1￿
= ￿￿￿ = a(!m) for every ! 2 T1 where m 5 M.






and set it aS. We can always ￿nd










Fix an arbitrary A $ E. Since xS 2 (x;x) and %E is continuous, for an event
A $ E such that xA 2 (x;x), we can always ￿nd su¢ ciently small " > 0 and ￿ > 0








with xS + " < al and xS ￿ ￿ > al+1. When











































































EnS aS d￿ = 0
, f[￿(A [ T2) ￿ ￿(T2)] + [￿(E [ T2 [ T3) ￿ ￿(A [ T2 [ T3)]gu
￿
xS￿









Rearranging terms in (3) and (4), we obtain
￿E (A) =
￿(A [ T2) ￿ ￿(T2)
[￿(A [ T2) ￿ ￿(T2)] + [￿(E [ T2 [ T3) ￿ ￿(A [ T2 [ T3)]
. (5)
Since the choice of A is arbitrary and the denominator is always strictly positive






. Any binary act is written in the form of bAw for





































, u(x) ￿ f￿E (A)u(b) + [1 ￿ ￿E (A)]u(w)g = 0 (by (5))
,
Z
u ￿ x d￿E ￿
Z
u ￿ bAw d￿E = 0
, x ￿E bAw. (6)


















E (x;%E;%) for any x 2 X.
Lemma 2. Suppose that %E 2 ￿CE has a CCBA and for all A ￿ E, xA = x or
x. Then, there exists a G 2 G such that ￿(x;G) 2  
2
E (x;%E;%) for every x 2 X.
Proof. If there is no proper subset B $ E such that xB = x, then there is no
binary act indi⁄erent to x other than itself. In this case, it is clear that for any
a 2 F, xB ￿E x , xB
Ea ￿ xEa, hence for all G 2 G, ￿(x;G) 2  
2
E (x;%E;%).
Suppose that, for some B $ E, xB = x. Pick an element of  
2
E (x;%E;%)
and call it a. Consider P (a). xB = x implies that ￿E (B) = 1. Then we always
￿nd su¢ ciently small ￿ > 0 such that x ￿E xB (x ￿ ￿) with x ￿ ￿ > al+1. Since
a 2  
2
E (x;%E;%), we have
xEa ￿ xB (x ￿ ￿)EnB a
,
Z
u ￿ xEa d￿ ￿
Z
u ￿ xBxEnBa d￿ = 0
, ￿(E [ T2 [ T3) ￿ ￿(B [ T2 [ T3)
+ [￿(E [ T2 [ T3) ￿ ￿(B [ T2 [ T3)]u(x ￿ ￿) = 0.





On the other hand, consider EnB. Since ￿E (B) = 1, we have ￿E (EnB) = 0.
Then for every " 2 [0;x￿x], we have x ￿E (x + ")EnB x. Now consider ￿(x;P (a)).
Then
xE￿(x;P (a)) ￿ (x + ")EnB xB￿(x;P (a))
,
Z
u ￿ xE￿(x;P (a)) d￿ ￿
Z
u ￿ (x + ")EnB xB￿(x;P (a)) d￿ = 0
, [￿((EnB) [ T2 [ T3) ￿ ￿(T2 [ T3)]u(x + ") = 0.
7However, by convexity of ￿, we have
￿((EnB) [ T2 [ T3) ￿ ￿(T2 [ T3) 5 ￿(E [ T2 [ T3) ￿ ￿(B [ T2 [ T3) = 0,
hence ￿((EnB) [ T2 [ T3) = ￿(T2 [ T3). For event EnB, we have ￿E (EnB) = 0,




= 1 ￿ ￿E (B)
= 0.
Therefore, we have x ￿E (x + ")EnB x , xE￿(x;P (a)) ￿ (x + ")EnB xB￿(x;P (a))
for every " > 0, hence ￿(x;P (a)) 2  
2
E (x;%E;%).
From the above argument, for every A ￿ E, the relationship in (6) of Lemma 1
also holds, hence ￿(x;P (a)) 2  
2
E (x;%E;%) for any x 2 X.
Lemma 3. Given a G 2 G, if ￿(x;G) 2  
2
E (x;%E;%) for any x 2 X, then
￿E = ￿G
E.
Proof. Given a G 2 G, suppose ￿(x;G) 2  
2
E (x;%E;%) for any x 2 X. By
Lemma 1, ￿E (A) 2 (0;1) is determined as in (5) for every A ￿ E. In addition,
Lemma 2 tells that ￿E (A) = 1 if ￿(E [ T2 [ T3) = ￿(A [ T2 [ T3) and ￿E (A) = 0
if ￿(A [ T2) = ￿(T2) for any G. It is also expressed by (5).
Furthermore, by convexity of ￿, we have ￿E (E [ A) ￿ ￿E (A) = ￿E (E) ￿
￿E (A \ E) for any A 2 ￿. However, E ￿ E [ A, so ￿E (E [ A) = ￿E (E) = 1 by
monotonicity. Hence ￿E (A \ E) = ￿E (A). Furthermore we also have ￿E (A \ E) 5
￿E (A) by monotonicity. Thus we obtain ￿E (A \ E) = ￿E (A) = ￿G
E (A) for each
A 2 ￿.







For any A 2 ￿, we have
￿((A \ E) [ T2) ￿ ￿(T2) + ￿(E [ T2 [ T3) ￿ ￿((A \ E) [ T2 [ T3) > 0,
by the assumption that ￿(E) > 0 and ￿￿ s convexity.
Any binary act in F2 is expressed in the form of bAw, where b, w 2 X with
b = w and A 2 ￿. Then
xE￿(x;G) ￿ (bAw)E ￿(x;G)
,
Z
u ￿ xE￿(x;G) d￿ ￿
Z
u ￿ bA\EwAc\E￿(x;G) d￿ = 0











, u(x) ￿ f￿E (A)u(b) + [1 ￿ ￿E (A)]u(w)g = 0
,
Z
u ￿ x d￿G
E ￿
Z
u ￿ bAw d￿G
E = 0
, x ￿E bAw.
8It follows that for every A 2 ￿, we have x ￿E bAw , xE￿(x;G) ￿ bAwEnA￿(x;G)
for all bAw 2 F2. Thus ￿(x;G) 2  
2
E (x;%E;%) for every x 2 X, which completes
the proof.
Theorem 1 proves that, when an event E occurred, a G 2 G represents a decision
maker￿ s conditioning pattern on every state in Ec. It is supposed to illustrate a
condition for a decision maker to have a coherent conditioning pattern with any
event E observed.
Let b ￿ be the set of events which is removed ? and ￿ from ￿. Let f%EgE2b ￿
be a collection of conditional preferences where every %E 2 ￿CE is represented by
(u;￿E). With convenience, put  
2
E (x;%E;%) = F for any x 2 X when jEj = 1 or
￿(E) = 0.
Definition 2. A collection of conditional preferences f%EgE2b ￿ has a certainty-
equivalently consistent counterfactual act for binary acts (CBA) if for every x in X
there exists an act a in F such that for every E 2 b ￿
x ￿E f , xEa ￿ fEa for all f 2 F2.






? for every x 2 X.
Corollary 1. Suppose that the unconditional preference relation % in ￿CE is
represented by (u;￿). Then, the following statements are equivalent:
(i) A collection of conditional preferences f%EgE2b ￿ has a CBA.





3.2.2. Uniqueness of G
For various applications, it is especially useful to clarify the su¢ cient condition
for the uniqueness of G. As noted in the previous subsection, it is quite natural
that one expects any G 2 G to represent %E when ￿ is additive. The condi-






act ￿(x;G) = xG1xG2x, which is identi￿ed by G. Therefore, some di⁄erent Gs to







. To obtain the uniqueness of G, we need to know some
restrictions on the unconditional preference, hence the unconditional capacity, ￿,
in the followings:
Definition 3. A capacity ￿ is strictly positive if for all A in b ￿, ￿(A) > 0.
In general, a ￿ may assign 0 to some events. In those cases, we can transform ￿
into a convex combination with a uniform distribution ￿. Formally, given a ￿, let
b ￿ = (1 ￿ ")￿+"￿ for some " > 0 su¢ ciently small, where ￿ : ￿ ! [0;1], ￿ (A) =
jAj
n
for any A 2 ￿. Remind that this transformation does not alter analyses below.
Definition 4. A capacity ￿ is called strictly convex if for all A and B in b ￿
with A * B nor B * A, ￿(A [ B) > ￿(A) + ￿(B) ￿ ￿(A \ B).
9The strict convexity is interpreted as strictly increasing in marginal increments
in the lower probability of any event. However, one cannot hope for the uniqueness
of G only from ￿￿ s strict convexity (and strict positiveness). Let us see the following
example:





￿ if jAj = 1
3￿ if jAj = 2
7￿ if A = ￿
, where ￿ = 1
7.
It is easily veri￿ed that this ￿ is strictly positive and strictly convex. However,

























This example shows that ￿￿ s strict convexity is not enough to discriminate between
the NB and DS rules. We introduce a family of ￿s that generate ￿NB
E = ￿DS
E for
any E 2 b ￿:
Definition 5. A capacity ￿ is marginally increasing by a constant ratio if for














Lemma 4. Suppose that ￿ is strictly positive and strictly convex. ￿NB
E = ￿DS
E
for every E 2 b ￿, if and only if ￿ is marginally increasing by a constant ratio.
Proof. Suppose that ￿ is marginally increasing by a constant ratio for some
t > 0. It is immediately obvious that ￿ is strictly positive. It is also veri￿ed that
for any t > 0, ￿ is strictly positive as follows. For A and B in b ￿ with A * B nor
B * A
















10On the other hand
















Since jBj > jA \ Bj and t > 0 by assumption, we conclude that ￿(A [ B)￿￿(A) >
￿(B) ￿ ￿(A \ B).
Take any E 2 b ￿ and consider ￿NB
E and ￿DS






























￿=1 (t + 1)
￿￿1 .














￿=1 (t + 1)
￿￿1
Pn
￿=1 (t + 1)
￿￿1 ￿
PjEcj
￿=1 (t + 1)
￿￿1
= (t + 1)
￿jE
cj
On the other hand
￿(A)
￿(A [ Ec) ￿ ￿(Ec)
=
PjAj
￿=1 (t + 1)
￿￿1
PjA[Ecj
￿=1 (t + 1)
￿￿1 ￿
PjEcj
￿=1 (t + 1)
￿￿1
= (t + 1)
￿jE
cj :
It follows that ￿NB
E (A) = ￿DS
E (A) for every A $ E.
As for the other direction, suppose that for some S 2 b ￿, ￿(S) 6= T
PjSj
￿=1 (t + 1)
￿￿1.





￿(A [ Sc) ￿ ￿(Sc)
.





￿(A [ S) ￿ ￿(S)
.
11Theorem 2. Suppose that j￿j = 3 and the unconditional preference relation
% in ￿CE is represented by (u;￿) where ￿ is strictly positive and strictly convex
but not marginally increasing by any constant ratio. If a collection of conditional
preferences f%EgE2b ￿ has a CBA, then there exists a unique G in G such that for










E for all E 2 b ￿.
At ￿rst, suppose that G3 \ (G0
1 [ G0
2) 6= ?, that is, there exists a state ! 2
G3 \ (G0
1 [ G0
2). There are two cases where (1) ! 2 G3 \ G0
1 and (2) ! 2 G3 \ G0
2.
Case 1: ! 2 G3 \ G0
1.
Let E = ￿nf!g. Then, for every A $ E
￿G
0






￿(A) + 1 ￿ ￿(A [ f!g)
= 0.
However, we have
￿(￿nf!g) < ￿(A) + 1 ￿ ￿(A [ f!g),
since b ￿ is strictly positive and strictly convex. Hence ￿G
E (A) < ￿G
0
E (A), which leads
contradiction.
Case 2: ! 2 G3 \ G0
2.
Consider E = ￿nf!g. For every A $ E we have
￿G
0
E (A) ￿ ￿G
E (A)
=




￿(A) + 1 ￿ ￿(A [ f!g)
=
[1 ￿ ￿(A [ f!g)][￿(A [ f!g) ￿ ￿(A) ￿ ￿(f!g)]
[1 ￿ ￿(f!g)][￿(A) + 1 ￿ ￿(A [ f!g)]
> 0.
The last inequality is due to ￿￿ s strict positiveness and strict convexity. It again




From the above arguments, we have G3\(G0
1 [ G0
2) = ?, hence G3 = G0
3. Since
G 6= G0, it only remains to assume G1 \ G0
2 6= ? without loss of generality.
Suppose that ￿ is not constant ratio for any t > 0.





￿(A [ Ec) ￿ ￿(Ec)
.
Therefore, for this event E, ￿NB
E 6= ￿DS
E , hence G1 \ G0
2 = ?.
It follows that G 6= G0 cannot generate the same conditionals, hence G is unique.
124. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have investigated a characterization of the G-updating rule. To relax the
Bayesian hypothesis, we concentrate on the set of binary acts. However, it might
also suggest the limitation in the method of unconditional-conditional preferences
approach, since further widening the sets of counterfactual acts may not generate
any consistent preferences, and become disconnected with reality. Although it is
quite di¢ cult to test and measure out how to revise subjective uncertainty, it is the
matter for future investigation anticipated eagerly in a behavioral sense.
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